

Security Research in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles

Dan Klinedinst

Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213



Software Engineering Institute

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Covering research by:

CERT Coordination Center

US-CERT

US Dept. of Transportation

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Disclaimer

I work for the CERT Division at Carnegie Mellon University.

Most of this research was performed under contract to US-CERT and the US Dept. of Transportation.

I do not speak for the US government.

URLs:

The URLs for all resources in this talk are at:

<https://pastebin.com/8e66av75>



Background – Who is CERT/CC?

Carnegie Mellon University

- Software Engineering Institute (SEI)
- Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)
- CERT/CC
 - CERT Coordination Center
- Vulnerability Analysis
 - Sponsorship from US-CERT, Department of Transportation, others




Who Is Dan?

- Vulnerability Researcher on Attack Modeling Team
- Focused on cars, robots, IoT, edge computing
- Previously helped build national penetration testing program
- Co-founder of BSides Pittsburgh



Our place in the industry



Example: CAN vulnerability

- CERT/CC analyzed and forwarded pre-publication information to OEMs and Auto-ISAC

A Stealth, Selective, Link-layer Denial-of-Service Attack Against Automotive Networks



<https://www.politesi.polimi.it/handle/10589/126393>

Collaborations

- US-CERT
- Dept. of Transportation
- Auto-ISAC
- SAE
- IEEE Center for Secure Design
- FASTR (Future of Automotive Security Technology Research)
- US Govt. Fleet Cybersecurity Steering Committee
- NMFTA (National Motor Freight Traffic Association)
- Carnegie Mellon Robotics Institute, Traffic 21, Mobility 21

Aftermarket Telematics

On Board Diagnostics: Risks and Vulnerabilities of the Connected Vehicle


April 2016

By Dan J. Klinedinst, Christopher King

- Collaboration with DoT Volpe Center and US-CERT
- Examined sample of OBD-II devices
- Vulnerabilities in most of them

<https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=453871>

<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/251927>
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/615456>



OEM / Third party / Aftermarket



Heavy Trucks / Buses / Construction



Vulnerabilities in fleet management systems*



* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EWba-wAbQBw>

Cellular Security

Assessing Risk and Security in Vehicular Cellular Connections

Dan Klinedinst

<https://www.escar.info/downloads.html>

“Cellular connections... are the front door from the Internet to the vehicle.”

Satellite communications are vulnerable, too.

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Vulnerability Notes Database

Advisory and mitigation information about software vulnerabilities

[DATABASE HOME](#) | [SEARCH](#) | [REPORT A VULNERABILITY](#) | [HELP](#)

Search Results

ID	Date Public	Title
VU#917348	11 Jul 2014	Datum Systems satellite modem devices contain multiple vulnerabilities
VU#882207	07 Aug 2014	Cobham Aviator satellite terminals contain multiple vulnerabilities
VU#614751	15 Feb 2017	Hughes satellite modems contain multiple vulnerabilities
VU#578598	07 Aug 2014	Iridium Pilot and OpenPort contain multiple vulnerabilities
VU#269991	07 Aug 2014	Cobham Sailor 6000 series satellite terminal contain hardcoded credentials
VU#460687	07 Aug 2014	Cobham Sailor satellite terminals contain hardcoded credentials
VU#250358	31 Jan 2014	Hughes Network Systems Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) satellite t...
VU#586501	20 Jul 2017	Inmarsat AmosConnect8 Mail Client Vulnerable to SQL Injection and Backdo...

V2X – US-DOT Pilot Programs

- New York City – Dense urban environment
- Wyoming – Busy freight corridor
- Tampa – Combined expressway / surface streets



V2V and V2I must be secure

- Secure Credential Management System
- Largest PKI deployment in the world
 - 250M cars with hundreds of certificates each
- Security is a big challenge
- Privacy is also a big challenge
 - Obscure location
 - Pseudonym certificates

Uber Advanced Technology Center Pittsburgh, PA, USA



Standards / Best Practices Work

- **NHTSA (US-DOT) Cybersecurity Best Practices**
- **National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA)**
 - Series of guideline documents on IoT, vulnerabilities, etc.
- **Auto-ISAC Automotive Cybersecurity Best Practices**
- **IEEE Center for Secure Design**
 - “Design Flaws and Security Considerations for Telematics and Infotainment Systems”
- **FASTR Guidelines for Secure Over-The-Air (SOTA) Updates**
- **SAE J3061**


<https://pastebin.com/8e66av75>



FASTR
Future of Automotive Security Technology Research

FUTURE OF AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY | Opportunities for Research & Innovation

FASTR™ views the automotive security landscape holistically, including everything from the physical supply chain, to consumer electronics used to unlock your car door, to the technical stack responsible for perception and motion planning, and beyond. All of these components must be understood together, in order to accelerate a safe and reliable realization of tomorrow's vehicles.



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Training from CERT Coordination Center

- Vulnerability Response Capability Development
- One day course, delivered at your site
- Basics of setting up a vulnerability response program
- Communications, tools, bug bounties, etc.
- 30 years of “lessons learned” from CERT/CC
- Software, hardware, cyber-physical products
- <https://www.sei.cmu.edu/training/P123.cfm>

Questions?



Contact Information:

Dan Klinedinst

djklinedinst@cert.org

Public Vulnerability Information:

www.kb.cert.org/vuls